In April 2021, it was announced that a US-Chinese team of scientists had brought embryos into existence containing both human and monkey cells, which survived for up to 19 days. The aim was to demonstrate that it was maybe possible, one day, to breed certain animals, especially pigs, which contain human organs for transplantation.1 However, from a more general perspective, the bringing into existence of human nonhuman interspecies living beings, such as human-monkey combinations, raises a number of significant ethical challenges. One of these, which is discussed relatively extensively in academic literature, relates to the moral status of the resulting living beings. But another aspect, which has not yet been sufficiently developed, concerns the very manner in which such living beings are brought into existence. The UK bioethicist, David A. Jones explains that any attempt to generate a human-monkey child is an offence against the dignity of procreation, indicating:
[T]he infant would not be the fruit of a human relationship nor be able to develop full human relationships with both parents. One parent would not be human, and the possibility of a human relationship with the human parent would be compromised or perhaps impossible, depending on whether the infant shared a humanlike rational nature.2
Against this background, however, it may be useful to seek to unpack the preconditions that are actually necessary for an ethical procreation to take place.
Procreation and its normative aspect
In an ideal situation, the generation of new living persons takes place in the context of unconditional love and acceptance between a man and a woman – a normative perspective, which can be seen as an important aspect of the particular act of procreation (in contrast to other acts of generation, such as manufacture). In this regard, pro in Latin means, ‘on behalf of’ or ‘for’; thus, children are procreated ‘for’ the parents but also ‘for’ the child’s sake.3
However, children may also be procreated ‘for’ others in a community so that they can unconditionally love, and be loved by, these others. The American theologian and bioethicist, Brent Waters, develops this idea, indicating that: ‘A child is not the outcome of a reproductive project, but exhibits an unfolding familial love. Thus, a child is not a means of self-fulfillment, but the impetus of an expansive and loving fellowship.’4 In the procreation of a child, therefore, an act of ‘begetting’ takes place because he or she is recognized as having the same moral status, worth and nature as those who brought him or her into existence. Another American theologian and bioethicist, Gilbert Meilaender, explains:
In begetting we give rise to one like us, one with whom we share a nature equal in being and dignity. Since we do not transcend the child we have begotten, we do not give it worth and significance any more than we understand ourselves to have been given dignity by our progenitors.5
Thus, children are procreated by their parents ‘like from like’6 and can never be considered merely from a consumerist perspective as objects or products because they are as precious in value and in worth as their parents.
Interestingly, and even though no single definition of the concept of procreation exists, the word does usually presuppose an aspirational and traditional manner of generating children. In other words, it assumes that two human parents are involved in the act of begetting through an exclusive and unconditional loving relationship. As Meilaender again explains: ‘[I]n distinctively human procreation the child is not simply a product of the will or choice of its progenitor. It is, instead, the internal fruition of an act of marital love.’7
Similarly, the American bioethicist, Leon Kass, indicates: ‘How does begetting differ from making? In natural procreation, human beings come together, complementarily male and female, to give existence to another being who is formed, exactly as we were’.8 This means that a number of preconditions may be necessary for persons to procreate and beget new persons – requirements that have generally been recognized as being valuable and important in the past. Thus, for procreation to occur, it may be suggested that the generation should take place from:
The question then arises whether it is ever possible to procreate human-nonhuman interspecies living beings who may be considered as persons with full value and worth. Indeed, this may be difficult since procreation requires that two persons with full inherent value and worth generate a new being from their exclusive, selfless, unconditional and faithful embodied love for one another. It may be very challenging, for example, for any human person to fulfil these requirements with a nonhuman animal.
This may mean that, in the context of generating human-nonhuman interspecies persons, another term may be necessary which may include the concept of production ‘on behalf of’ or ‘for’ the producers, often as a result of a conscious intervention or decision. Thus, the act of producing may represent a form of reproduction or of manufacture, whereby something (or someone) new is brought into existence.
In this regard, the concept of manufacture reflects a bringing together of raw materials by hand or by machinery and is not usually used for the generation of persons. However, when this happens, Kass explains that the resulting persons may then be seen as having only an economic commercial value. He indicates: ‘And procreation dehumanized into manufacture is further degraded by commodification’9. In other words, the granting of property rights to human-nonhuman interspecies persons by their manufacturers may have significant ethical consequences for them. These includes the risk of being:
What is disturbing, therefore, about the manufacture of possible human-nonhuman interspecies persons is that they may be instrumentalized to fulfil the needs or desires of another person. Furthermore, the commodification of a being by the generators may make this individual susceptible to be objectified and/or commodified by others who may then just see this being as the sum total of its (his or her) marketable parts.14
What are the consequences of generating new persons outside of procreation?
As already indicated, for specific acts of procreation to occur, it is necessary for two persons to generate children from their exclusive, selfless, unconditional and faithful embodied love for one another. A love that is then embodied in the resulting children which enables them to know that they were procreated by love, to be loved, thereby confirming that they have a rightful place in existence. In other words, that their very existence is unconditionally welcomed – that they do not have to ask why they exist or fulfil certain preconditions for their acceptance. This also means that because children should be brought into existence through the embodied unity of their parents, they cannot be seen as their possessions. Instead, children and their parents can be considered as belonging together as a family of equals. As Meilaender notes:
A child who is thus begotten, not made, embodies the union of his father and mother. They have not simply reproduced themselves, nor are they merely a cause of which the child is an effect. Rather, the power of their mutual love has given rise to another who, though different from them and equal in dignity to them, manifests in his person the love that unites them. Their love-giving has been life-giving; it is truly procreation. The act of love that overcame their separation and united them in “one flesh,” that direct them out of themselves and toward each other, creates in the child a still larger community.15
In this context, the story of Frankenstein can also be used as a warning to those seeking to bring new kinds of persons into existence.16 Accordingly, the US based bioethicist, Josephine Johnston, indicates:
In a straightforward – even didactic – way, the novel [of Frankenstein] chronicles the devastating consequences for an inventor and those he loves of his utter failure to anticipate the harm that can result from raw, unchecked scientific curiosity. 17
In a similar fashion, the generators of new human-nonhuman interspecies persons may not comprehend what they are really doing or what it means to bring a new living being into existence. They may not even understand all the possible risks, especially if the resulting beings are of dubious moral status who exist in a human-nonhuman interface. In this regard, Jones indicates: ‘It is always wrong deliberately to create beings that have an uncertain or perplexing moral status.’18 This is because, the resulting beings may not only struggle to be accepted by society but their existence may undermine the understanding and very meaning of inherent value and worth of all persons in society.
The lack of foresight of such unethical generators is again exemplified by Frankenstein, who looks forward with excitement, at first, to the day when his new being would come into existence: ‘A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve theirs’.19 He soon discovers how mistaken he was, when the monster indicts him with all his suffering and loneliness:
Unfeeling, heartless creator! You had endowed me with perceptions and passions, and then cast me abroad an object for the scorn and horror of mankind. But, on you only had I any claim for pity and redress, and from you I determined to seek that justice which I vainly attempted to gain from any other being that wore the human form.20
In a similar way, it is very likely that future human-nonhuman interspecies persons will feel angry and bewildered if they are not procreated from the embodied love of their generators. Again, this is movingly illustrated by Frankenstein’s creature and its search for identity. Though Frankenstein had intended his creature to be attractive, the experiment is a disaster and results in a monster who he then completely rejects and abandons. But the nameless creature goes in search for his generator since he realizes that Frankenstein is the real origin and cause of his very existence and life, and that he must therefore be the answer to his deep existential angst. The monster, in a way, is looking for answers as to why he was generated while seeking to understand the deep sense of rejection and abandonment he experiences. His anguish and distress are deeply moving in his exclamation: ‘My person was hideous and my stature gigantic. What did this mean? Who was I? What was I? Whence did I come? What was my destination? These questions continually recurred, but I was unable to solve them.’ 21
Likewise, it is possible that new human-nonhuman interspecies persons generated outside of procreation will feel completely lost in their very existence and identity. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the generation of such new beings could ever be possible without them experiencing deep anguish and suffering making this generation completely unethical.
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